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Whefl Cyprus joins the European Union it will be joining a Community of 
aroufld twenty-one states, that would still be in a process of negotiations for 
anotl1er wave of enlargement, leading eventually to a Union of 27 or more 
member states. The main characteristics of this Union-to-be will be its 
heterogeneity in terms of the levels of economic development, languages, 
religions, political and legal systems, defence and foreign policy orientation. It 
will be a Union composed mainly of small states with a population of around 
10 million or less.1 In a European Union of 21 member states, Cyprus will only 
be above Luxembourg in population terms, but equal to it in all respects when 
it comes to participation in th.e Union's institutions. Further, Cyprus will be 
joining an EU in which the Mediterranean region features rather low in its 
priorities and this goes against a fundamental Cypriot interest that as an EU 
member state it would want the Union to be a greater factor in Mediterranean 
stability. Over and above these considerations, Cyprus is most likely to be still 
burdened by the unresolved "Cyprus Question". 
The wider objective of Cyprus's policy of joining the European Union is 
intimately linked to the island's weakness in world politics that derives from its 
small size. Therefore, for Cyprus, it must be expected that its membership 
priorities would be to reduce its economic and political vulnerabilities. No 
doubt, Cyprus will use its membership to try and resolve the "Cyprus 
Question", but presumably looking beyond this issue, it will also have a strong 
interest in the maintenance of stability in the Mediterranean region, since the 
latter is the context or environment in which it has to survive and prosper. The 
main question then is how Cypriot priorities will fit with the aims of the Union 
and its member states. 
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The most encouraging factor is that due to its small size and possibly the 
effects of the "Cyprus Problem", Cyprus has exhibited both a strong measure 
of foreign policy coherence and strong domestic support, which, if projected 
into the future, will increase its potential for success in pursuing its aims at the 
European level. The aims Cyprus should pursue at the level of the EU level 
will no doubt first be articulated at the national level and then be transposed to 
the EU institutions where Cypriot executives will engage in a continuous 
bargaining game involving fellow executives from the other member states 
and representatives of the supranational institutions. This is the daily life of 
most member states as captured by both the inter-govern mentalist and 
comparative political or mUlti-governance approaches to the analysis of EU 
decision-making. At the EU level, a measure of flexibility and the formation of 
coalitions is required to ensure overall success, and in the end, and in most 
cases, the outcome may be different from that initially formulated nationally. 
When Cyprus joins the EU, not only state executives but also sub-national 
actors will participate in the EU's decision-making process. In some instances 
the latter may also try to circumvent the national authorities by appeal to, or 
collusion with, European supranational institutions or plain Europe-wide 
players. The decision-making process is indeed a messy and not a 
straightforward one. 
In the light of this discussion it is tempting to divert the analysis to a numerical 
and quantitative approach, comparing the weight Cyprus will have in the 
institutions with that of the other member states, the potential coalition 
permutations in which it could be involved, the potential players and the likely 
outcomes. In this framework too, a number of variables could also be isolated 
that would help to explain possible coalition formations, like neutralism and 
pacifism, smallness, level of development, geographic position and so on. 
State-type is likely to explain a strong measure of the member states' foreign 
policy. Concurrently, analysis can also focus on the foreign-policy priorities 
that states have formulated or are likely to take a strong position on, thus 
permitting the analyst to identify a "community of mutual interests" that may 
lead member states to collude on certain issues but not on others. 
All these approaches are important, however there is one simple fact that 
must not be ignored, namely that small states, in spite of their weakness, are 
not completely impotent in the international system, nor must they be 
considered so in a Community of states such as the EU. A quantitative 
analysis of small states in the EU such as the one alluded to in the previous 
paragraph runs the danger of overlooking the importance on certain policy 
issues that small states can have. In sum, small states cannot influence 
policies across the board, but they can initiate important policy initiatives and 
influence policy-making in other areas not started by them. It is to this role that 
Cyprus and other small states must attach importance. 
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Lack of resources constrains small states to prioritise and concentrate on 
t~eir immediate problems. Applied to Cyprus, this means that, besides its 
ONn economic development and the solution of the national question, the 
dher big problem that would loom large in Cypriot EU and foreign policy 
concerns would be the question of security and stability in the Mediterranean 
region. In practice, Cyprus would only achieve its aims by building coalitions 
vith other states which is nothing new considering that this is the staple 
cpproach in decision-making in the EU. 
However, the number of possible coalitions that Cyprus would be able to 
enter into, to achieve specific targets, could vary widely: for example, with 
Clther Mediterranean member states; with states that are similarly weak and 
snail or are located on Europe's periphery and are deeply concerned about 
the instability they face beyond the Union's frontiers; with member states of 
comparable economic development or which have similar sectional interests. 
()f course states with similar priorities can also at times find themselves in a 
competitive rather than a collaborative relationship as they may be struggling 
for the meagre supply of scarce resources. Thus the Mediterranean member 
states have the strongest reason to pursue stability in the Mediterranean 
region and to achieve this by granting more trade concessions to the 
Mediterranean non-member countries. However, traditionally they have been 
the staunchest opponents of freer agricultural trade in the Mediterranean region. 
lhe Mediterranean Dimension that the European Union Confronts 
As an EU member state, Cyprus will be in the unique position of being the 
only wholly Mediterranean State of the Union and therefore the most sensitive 
to instability in the region. The other Mediterranean member states ofthe EU -
France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, even though the latter is not a 
Mediterranean littoral state - are all continental states and this has meant that 
for the greater part of their history, they have been strongly engaged in 
political events as they have unfolded in the central European core. We need 
not be reminded that one of the main aims of the Schuman Declaration was to 
bring reconciliation between France and Germany. Historically then, 
European interest in the Mediterranean region has been fleeting and 
inconsistent. In the 19th century, during the colonial era, the Mediterranean 
region was a peripheral zone supplying the European core, while the sea was 
a means of communications linking the northern regions of Europe with their 
possessions in Africa and the Far East. Though the European powers 
established colonies from Morocco to Syria, they were unable to impose their 
complete hegemony on the region. Indeed, the last time the Mediterranean 
region was united under a single European power was during the era of the 
Roman Empire. 
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The EU faces two main types of problems in the Mediterranean region: first 
the challenges posed to security in the wider meaning and second the 
conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean region that make the realisation of 
a Mediterranean policy difficult if not impossible. Both types of problems must 
be addressed if a Mediterranean policy is to be successfully launched and 
maintained over time. 
One of the conditions that undermine the chances of success of a 
Mediterranean policy is the political fragmentation in the region. Unity and 
diversity have paradoxically co-existed for a long time in the Mediterranean 
region. Norman Davies has observed that, "once the Muslim states took root 
in the Levant and in Africa, the Mediterranean became an area of permanent 
political division."2 This is an overstatement of the facts considering the long 
period of cohabitation between Islam and Christianity, a situation that was 
disturbed permanently by the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. Since 
then, division has been endemic and is likely to persist in the future. 
Therefore, what the European Union can hope to achieve in the region is to 
metaphorically keep the fire under control and not to extinguish it completely. 
The chances of some form of political unity in the region appear precarious 
though not wholly farfetched. The current state of fact is that the 
Mediterranean region does not yet meet the requirements of an 'international 
region'. Sub-regional and local systems have become the dominant factor in 
some of its areas.3 A form of minimalist region-wide union must be 
considered only in a longer-term perspective, at first based on economic 
integration and co-operation, in other words an enhanced free trade area. 
The most cited· Mediterranean problem is the one of security in its widest 
meaning, comprising hard and soft questions as well as other aspects such 
as environmental and socio-economic welfare. Apart from the long-standing 
problems such as those in the Middle East, the Aegean, Cyprus and the 
Maghreb, active volcanoes that continuously threaten the stability of the 
region to different degrees, there is near-complete agreement that the 
region-wide challenges to security around the Mediterranean littoral are of a 
non-military nature and are concentrated mainly in the southern 
Mediterranean shore countries, with the danger of spillover northwards. They 
are linked to socio-economic problems generated by sluggish economic 
growth, rooted in the fall in oil revenues, the wrong set of policies pursued in 
these states and at times mismanagement of resources. These problems are 
a direct challenge to the survival of the political establishments in the main 
Arab states. The ramifications from the demise of the present state-structures 
in the southern Mediterranean shore countries remain hypothetical, involving 
a measure of crystal ball gazing, and varying in their prognosis from the utter 
pessimistic4 to the imprudently optimistic. Considering the relative strengths 
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of both sides of the Mediterranean littoral, the collapse of order in the south 
mtay, at worst, result in nuisance policies for Europe, such as migratory 
pressures, and at best, though gradually, it may evolve into a new era of 
nath-south co-existence on novel principles. 
A serious military threat to Europe from the south is most unlikely and the 
sruthern Mediterranean countries probably attach more importance to the 
iniernal rather than the external threats to their security, while among the latter 
they mostly fear threats from their fellow southern neighbours.s To be true, 
they are also suspicious of Nato's initiatives in the Mediterranean region 6 
while the alliance has commenced the "Nato Mediterranean Dialogue" with a 
number of countries of the region to alleviate these fears.? It has also started 
revising its southern flank strategy and a recent RAND Corporation study 
cammissioned by the Italian Ministry of Defence appears to lay emphasis on 
the soft security questions as the main threat Nato faces on the southern 
flank, namely the instability that may accompany political upheaval and 
sacio-economic pressures.s 
North African states are critical of Europe's lack of engagement in the security 
problems of the region, a failure they perceive as one of the causes of the 
regional arms race.9 However, as George Joffe pOints out, the European' 
Union is handicapped in taking an important security role in the 
Mediterranean region because of the presence of another key player, the 
United States, which has not shown any willingness to share its initiatives 
(such as in the Middle East) with the European states. Thus, the southern 
Mediterranean states tend not to treat the EU as an important interlocutor on 
such questions. 
Tile European Union's Mediterranean Policies 
Europe needs to watch the situation in the Mediterranean region carefully. It 
needs to take a more active role and not allow security in the region to be 
monopolised by outside powers. Its Mediterranean policy has to be a 
dual-track one as well: i.e. policies for dealing with sub-regional problems and 
policies for tackling the region-wide challenges. So far, the EU's initiatives in 
the Mediterranean region have had this flexibility. However, though since its 
founding the European Union has always felt the need of taking care of its 
own backyard, paradoxically the EU's Mediterranean policy has traditionally 
followed the sine curve of euphoric high points followed by longish periods of 
inertia. 
For the sake of consistency and credibility, a linear smoothing out of the 
cycle, or continuity, is urgently required. A glance at the present state of 
health of the EU's Mediterranean Partnership initiative is indicative of the lack 
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of continuity: in Barcelona in 1995, the member states of the European Union 
and the Mediterranean non-member countries announced yet another new 
start in their relations, pledging to set up a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
based on the principles of peace, security and shared prosperity. The plan 
promised action on a comprehensive front but though progress has been 
achieved in some of its aspects, much of the plan remains on paper, causing 
frustrations reminiscent of the failed Euro-Arab Dialogue. It may be argued 
that half a policy is better than none, but if expectations are allowed to rise too 
high only to be abandoned in free fall, then the result could indeed be 
stunning. 
If the EU wants to be an important player in the Mediterranean region, and the 
arguments show that it should, it must take a more vigorous approach and 
strengthen both its policy commitments and credibility. 
On the regional "hard" security aspects, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
has the least to offer in practice even though as a declaration of principles it 
has a lot of potential, while a basis for a security dialogue has been inserted in 
it. This aspect needs to be strengthened if regional security concerns are to 
be adequately dealt with. It is true that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
agreements signed between the EU and the individual Mediterranean 
partners enshrine the security dialogue in the legal text. But at the multi-lateral 
level it falters, most probably for the lack of interest shown by the 
Mediterranean non-member countries because of their suspicions of western 
interests and the condition mentioned by Joffe and referred to earlier. 
However, the Euro-Mediterranean relationship suffers from another problem, 
mainly a lack of legitimacy deriving from the lack of participation in real as 
opposed to formal decision-making by the Mediterranean countries. This lack 
of participation is itself caused by the existence of an institutional vacuum, 
that has to be addressed if the present relationship is to evolve into a proper 
"Partnership". Addressing the institutional vacuum will require the setting up of 
institutions conducive to joint decision-making in the Euro-Mediterranean 
region. Such institutions may also enhance not only the longevity of the 
partnership but also its consistency over time, apart from the various 
possibilities of functional spillover. The question that has to be asked in this 
context is how long the EU's Mediterranean partners will continue to accept a 
position of inferiority where the EU makes the major decisions and they are 
then asked to endorse them. The full impact of a future change in the political 
regimes in the southern shore countries, or a resurgence of nationalism or 
militancy, will probably be felt on this Achilles' heel of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, with the danger that such pressures could have a crippling effect 
on the Euro-Mediterranean initiative when it is most needed. 
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The creation of some EU-Mediterranean institutions will transform the EU's 
~olicy into a real partnership or an international regime. It will also address a 
second problem, namely that since the EU is an essentially northern and 
central European entity in which the Mediterranean region features very little, 
tlough as argued above it should be given more importance, the internal 
imbalance in the Union will be redressed by locking the Union in a permanent 
collaborative relationship in a region that is of primary importance to it. 
Therefore, the EU's Mediterranean policy should not be seen in static terms 
and it should be critically analysed to determine whether it is achieving its 
objectives. The current Mediterranean policy of the EU is far better than no 
policy at all; barring the caveat made earlier that it may give rise to unfulfilled 
expectations. Since most non-EU states around the Mediterranean littoral 
have adopted the liberal economic model to varying degrees, the economic 
dimension of the EU's policy, the free trade area, is intended to underpin 
1hese re-structuring efforts. The modest financial aid extended to the 
lJiediterranean countries is only moderately helpful. More important, as Alfred 
Tovias has argued, is the fact that the unintended outcomes may be more 
detrimental to the Mediterranean non-member states than to the EU.10 
The institutional vacuum in EU-Mediterranean relations means that the EU 
occupies the position of the preponderant actor in the Barcelona process. 
Indeed as the development of the policy has occurred so far, it has developed 
in a step-by-step fashion, each dominated by the European Commission and 
1he Council. Thus, 
• in the first stage, the Commission drew up its proposals for a new 
Mediterranean policy; 11 
• these were then endorsed by the Council and returned to the Commission 
practically unchanged to be put into effect; 
• the Commission began to negotiate the agreements on a bilateral basis 
with the Mediterranean partners. Two of these agreements being 
completed before the conclusion of the Barcelona Ministerial Conference 
of 1995, called to give the policy the seal of acceptance by all parties and 
formally, though not de facto, to remove any shadow of imposition.12 
The Barcelona process provides the framework for meetings of groups of 
experts at various levels to discuss a number of problems of an economic, 
political, social and cultural nature. Periodically there are also ministerial 
meetings in various issue areas; for example a meeting of the foreign 
ministers was scheduled for June 1998. A "Euro-Mediterranean Committee 
for the Barcelona Process", a sort of steering committee, has also been 
created, involving the non-member states. Thus, a number of "peripheral 
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institutions" have been created that could develop into fully-fledged ones in 
the future, though not necessarily. The multilateral aspect of the partnership 
remains weak, largely due to the fragmentation in the region, as was 
demonstrated by the follow-up meeting to Barcelona, which was held in Malta 
in April 1997, and which nearly ended in failure due to a worsening of the 
situation in the Middle East. These expert meetings may lead to functional 
spillover and the political conferences at ministerial level might yet develop 
into fully-fledged ministerial institutions of inter-governmental decision 
-making. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee of the Barcelona Process might 
also have its powers increased over time. But for all this to happen there must 
be the political will to promote it. 
In the meantime, the European Commission is the motive force of the 
process. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process relies 
on the European Commission for information and on its network of 
connections around the region. The Commission has taken the initiative to 
call and organise the various meetings at most levels. In practical terms this 
ensures that the institutional vacuum is filled, but it still means that the ultimate 
aim of creating a Euro-Mediterranean "Partnership" is not met. 
The last problem connected with the creation of Euro-Mediterranean 
institutions is whether the Mediterranean non-member states will be willing to 
set up the minimum of them required. In other words, is there the political will 
to establish them? If the inherent belief of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
is that the Mediterranean states will never be able to agree among themselves 
to set them up, then the provisions in the present policy of south-south 
integration are a chimera or legal fiction because it will never happen since 
economic integration assumes at least some level of co-operation between 
the participating states. However, if the EU takes the alternative approach of 
giving the non-member states greater responsibility in decision-making, then 
institution-building can succeed. One area in which greater responsibility can 
be transferred to joint EU-Mediterranean institutions is the one of detailed 
enactment and control of the free trade area agreements. 
What Sort of Euro-Mediterranean Institutions 
When searching for the types of institutions that can be set up in the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership, it is best to begin from already existing ones. 
The proto-types of such an institutional structure exist in the form of the 
institutional set-up of the European Economic Area (EEA) and were created to 
enhance collaboration for a more efficient running of the EEA without 
requiring the EFTA states to deepen their integration beyond what was 
necessary. 
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I. the EU-EFTA agreement that ushered in the European Economic Area 
(EEA), the following institutions were set up: an EEA Council, a Joint 
Committee, a Joint Parliamentary Committee, a Consultative Committee,13 an 
EFTA Surveillance Authority responsible for the application of the EEA rules 
and an EFTA Court.14 On issues requiring the interpretation of the EEA rules, 
tile Joint Committee can refer the issue to the European Court of Justice.15 To 
ensure the uniformity of interpretation of rules, since the EEA required the 
adoption by the EFTA states of substantial parts of Community legislation, the 
EEA agreement provides for the exchange of information between the 
European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities, the Courts of Last Instance of the EFTA states, the EFTA Court 
and the Joint Committee. 16 
These EEA institutions did not require full-scale integration by the EFTA 
slates. Their aim was to ensure an efficient, consistent and uniform 
application of rules and the smooth functioning of the EEA. The implications 
01 the EEA institutions are also applicable to the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership since the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area will involve more 
ttlan the dismantling of the traditional trade barriers. It will also involve the 
application of European Community Competition rules, common rules of 
origin, including cumulative rules of origin, and substantial parts of 
Community legislation. Not only must these rules be uniformly enacted in the 
dfterent national contexts, but they must also be uniformly interpreted 
throughout the Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone in order to remove all 
distortions to the smooth functioning offree trade. The settlement of disputes, 
judicial review and the enforcement of competition rules have to be done 
consistently throughout the region as well. Finally, some authority has to 
overlook the whole process to ensure enforcement and the elimination of 
"free-rider" practices and to act as a clearing-house that ensures compatibility 
to the overall objectives of the Partnership in the case of all the bilateral 
agreements between sovereign states as in the case of the south-south free 
trade accords. This task can be entrusted to a regional 'supranational' or 
intergovernmental authority empowered for the specific purpose. 
In sum the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area cannot do without the 
minimum of an institutional structure unless the Mediterranean non-member 
countries are ready to accept the Union's preponderance indefinitely. The 
need of such institutional structures increases when other factors are 
considered such as the achievement of south-south free trade agreements 
that are the second main leg of the realisation of the Euro-Mediterranean free 
trade area and which are potentially the most economically rewarding for the 
Mediterranean non-member countries. 17 
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The need for addressing the institutional vacuum also derives from the 
magnitude of the task itself. The first agreements that will usher in the 
Euro-Mediterranean free trade area are the bilateral ones that are being 
negotiated between the Commission and each individual Mediterranean 
Partner. Within this framework, the asymmetry of power between the 
Community and each Mediterranean partner comes into play and can have 
negative consequences on all the Mediterranean countries, as ably exhibited 
by the handling of the agricultural portfolio during the negotiations. But the 
biggest obstacle is that the full realisation of the free trade area will be 
achieved only when all the non-EU Mediterranean states have concluded 
bilateral free trade accords among themselves. The Commission is said to be 
preparing for this second phase in the development of the Euro 
-Mediterranean Partnership by preparing a "blue print" of a typical south-south 
agreement that will be handed to the non-member states to be negotiated by 
them, presumably with the Commission still holding their hands. 
When Cyprus joins the EU, leaving 11 non-member partners in the 
Mediterranean region, the number of bilateral agreements to achieve the task 
will be somewhere in the region of 55, if no account is taken of the other 
protocols that will be needed to put the co-operation aspects (industrial, 
environment, customs etc) into effect both on a north-south and on a 
south-south basis. The final count of all the agreements involved is impossible 
to establish. The proportion of the task does not seem to have been 
adequately put across. Since 1995, the EU has managed five bilateral 
accords. How many more years will it take to put the rest into place, ten, 
perhaps twenty or is it more likely to be 30 years? 
Fragmentation, the revealed preference of the non-EU states to trade with 
their former colonial powers, the failure of integration efforts at the regional 
and sub-regional levels, the sheer number of countries and ideological 
differences, the number of agreements that will be required to achieve the 
task and the preference of the Mediterranean non-member countries to 
negotiate with the Union on their own in the elusive bid to secure the best 
unilateral deal, resulting in the worse possible deals for all - these are the main 
factors undermining institution-building in the Euro-Mediterranean area. 
The method chosen to implement the partnership is simple in its initial stages 
and appears practical. It has the aura of getting things done. But in the 
second and subsequent phases it will lead to complications as indicated 
above. The large number of agreements that have to be concluded before the 
free trade area comes into effect has the advantage of helping the southern 
Mediterranean countries to achieve south-south regional integration. 
However, it also carries the danger that the process will stall at some point 
precipitating an incomplete free trade area. 
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Rnally, the institutional vacuum must be addressed if a meanin gful political 
dalogue is to be started in the region that may be conducive to the lessening 
01 tensions. 
~ Way of Conclusion 
The Role of Cyprus in the European Union 
If{here does Cyprus stand in all this? The main characteristic of a small state 
is its vulnerability. A serious disturbance in the Mediterranean or the erosion 
01 the regional status quo, affects the EU negatively but a small state like 
Cyprus in the middle of the region will be even more negatively affected. It is 
unlikely that Cyprus can withstand serious instability in the Mediterranean 
region. For example, in common with other European countries of the region, 
and increasingly so in the Arab world, tourism has become one of the main 
s()urces of income of the Republic and one need not dwell too much on the 
sensitivity of this economic sector to the rise of tension and instability in the 
region as exemplified by the negative effects on this sector of the Gulf war of 
1990. 
Cyprus is also poised to give a sound contribution to the enhancement of the 
overall security of the region. Indeed, the island which in the past suffered and 
presently suffers from aggression and division, has probably brewed a strong 
national consciousness that appreciates the validity of peace, the futility of 
~ar and the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes leading to 
peaceful co-existence. As an EU member state, Cyprus's potential role in the 
Mediterranean could be one of encouraging these values. In the EU, it will be 
in its interest to ensure a constant focus on these aims, which also happen to 
fall squarely within the interests of the Union as a whole. In this context, a 
peaceful resolution of the Cyprus Question may not only lead to a solution of 
other connected problems, such as Greek-Turkish relations, but it also 
strengthens Cypriot credibility in assuming an important role in the EU. 
Cyprus's credentials with the southern Mediterranean states are enhanced by 
the fact that it is a non-NATO country, though it should actively analyse the 
possibility of joining Nato's "Mediterranean dialogue" in order to strengthen 
this important security forum that may in the long run help in the reduction of 
misunderstandings between north and south in the region. 
As a small country which is a consumer and not a producer of security, 
without any aspirations to regional preponderance, its policies should be 
better understood by those countries in the Mediterranean with which Europe 
needs to enhance its security dialogue. 
Cyprus in the EU will have additional instruments in dealing with the region's 
problems. Outside the Union, Cyprus is a system-ineffectual state, to use 
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Robert O. Keohane's famous definition, but EU membership will change 
this.18 Thus from a state whose foreign policy is an adjustment to reality, 
Cyprus as an EU member state, will become a country participating in the 
formulation of policy of one of the most influential communities in the world. 
As an EU member, it can playa role disproportionate to its size. In carrying 
out its tasks, it will also have greater access to all the influential capitals of 
Europe. 
It is when pursuing these aims that the stronger complications might set in. As 
a small country Cyprus can seek the understanding and support of other EU 
member states, particularly the small states sharing acute security concerns, 
though it is important to bear in mind that their foreign policies may differ 
markedly due to the different contexts. As a former colony, and as a country 
that has suffered military aggression and division, Cyprus has a self-image 
which is moderated by a sense of helplessness shared by many states of the 
Mediterranean region, and can therefore be more sensitive to similar 
concerns. Its past contribution to non-alignment and its smallness, enhance 
its ability to play the role of the disinterested interlocutor in the Mediterranean 
region. Many can recall for example the role Cyprus played with other neutral 
and non-aligned states [N+N] during the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). In the last analysis then, Cyprus can use its 
small size, normally considered a major handicap, to help the EU refocus 
more on the severe challenges coming from the Mediterranean region and to 
the advantage of ensuring the success of its policies. 
Two obstacles may negatively affect this role. First there is the obvious 
problem of all small states, namely the lack of human and material resources 
to carry out their policies effectively. In this Cyprus has to devise strategic 
alliances to borrow the additional strength of its EU and Mediterranean 
partners, and the European supranational institutions and agencies, to 
supplement its shortage of this scarce commodity. Linked to this is the 
weakness of a small state in information gathering and analysis that is the 
only means by which it could possibly play an important role. 
The second major obstacle may arise if Cyprus becomes too involved in its 
internal issues distracting itself from the wider ones. This is not a call to an 
abandonment of the Cyprus problem: it is simply making the case for the 
national Cypriot debate on the role of Cyprus in the world, which has already 
started, to maintain always in focus the need that all states have, of achieving 
the desired balance between national and regional priorities, which in most 
cases need not be mutually exclusive. 
Geographically and as an EU member state, Cyprus will be on Europe's 
periphery, at the edge of the stability zone. It will thus be strategically situated 
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to be one of the first to confront the tidal wave in the event of heightened 
tensions in the region or a collapse of the present political order in the 
s ~uthern Mediterranean states. 
But geographic proximity and the shortness of economic distance to the 
s~uthern Mediterranean states mean that Cyprus has immense potential 
I>enefits to exploit following the successful conclusion of the Euro 
-Nediterranean free trade area. EU membership will be an important gateway 
fa Cyprus to more accessibility to the southern markets. However, if we go 
I>lck to the arguments developed earlier, namely that because the second 
phase of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area involving south-south 
accords will come towards the end of the process, and this is the more 
beneficial to the southern partners, the implication is that in the short to 
lTledium term the southern non-member countries may only experience the 
negative impact of their adjustment to free trade, implying that Cyprus will 
have few opportunities to exploit in the immediate years following 
lTlembership. 
FDr these reasons and more - such as the safeguarding of the Mediterranean 
environment, combating illicit arms and drug trafficking, not to mention other 
problems that were not mentioned in this short exposition such as the control 
on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - Cyprus has an important 
slake in the maintenance of the overall security and prosperity of the 
fviediterranean region and a reason for maintaining a constant profile on these 
issues in the EU. 
Therefore, EU membership can be used by Cyprus to transform its otherwise 
unimportance that derives from its smallness and weakness into 
effectiveness. Through membership, Cyprus can work and promote those EU 
pDlicies that are most conducive to the improvement of the regional 
environment in which Cyprus will have to prosper. This is an opportunity that 
is not available to all small states. The small and weak countries of the 
Caribbean Basin have no similar regional structures to integrate themselves 
in and thus transform themselves from being "system ineffective" into "system 
affecting" states, while in the meantime, integration among themselves would 
only add up to an aggregation of weakness. On the other hand, by joining the 
EU, Cyprus can become a "system affecting" state. 
A critique of the approach attempted in this article could take the form of a 
numerical analysis of Cyprus's weight in the institutions of the EU and the 
possible permutations of coalitions that can possibly be built to determine the 
best avenues for Cyprus to choose as an EU member state. However, such 
an approach has so many unquantifiable variables that it is unlikely to lead to 
definite and concrete policy proposals. Moreover, by concentrating on power 
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in the traditional meaning of the term in EU decision-making, and therefore 
the institutional weight a country has, it may miss the importance of the role 
that a country plays. A proper identification of national and regional priorities, 
a better co-ordination of scarce diplomatic and human resources, 
coalition-building, information-gathering and well-argued policies can be very 
effective at the Union level in assembling a sufficient level of support to ensure 
that some initiatives are taken. 
Lastly, a small state may also contemplate achieving its aims by alternative 
coalitions outside the EU. This policy instrument may be more hypothetical 
than real. However, this is where the question of the institutional vacuum in 
the Euro-Mediterranean context comes into play again. If the minimal, 
effective institutions are set up in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, thus 
locking the EU to some degree of power-sharing with the non-member states 
in the running of the Euro-Mediterranean international regime that will be 
created, the small state's influence and potential for alternative coalition 
building outside the confines of the Union increases not to mention the 
increase in the number of potential sources of its information. 
The main challenge for Cyprus in the EU is then on how to overcome the 
drawbacks of smallness and affect the internal balance of the European 
Union in a way that ultimately satisfies all its interests. 
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